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Breda Gray Irish State Diaspora 
 Engagement—
 “The Network State” 
 and “Netizens”* 
The status of Irish sovereignty is perhaps more in question now 
than at any other time since the foundation of the state following 
the recent financial crisis and subsequent European Union/European 
Central Bank/International Monetary Fund “bail out” and austerity 
program. This crisis and its aftermath reveal the extent to which sov-
ereignty is increasingly conceived in terms of state effectiveness in 
harnessing the flows of global capitalism.1 For example, since the 
2008 downturn, the Irish state has actively engaged global Irish busi-
ness leaders in aiding economic recovery from their positions of in-
fluence abroad. In 2009 the state moved to formalize relationships 
with influential members of the diaspora by establishing the Global 
Irish Forum (GIEF)2 and the Global Irish Network (GIN).3 These 
two flagship diaspora-engagement initiatives are aimed at harness-
ing those flows within the diaspora that might help integrate Ireland 
more effectively in the global economy. In this article, I argue that 
through these initiatives, some state functions are globally networked, 
. The term “state” is used here not in the sense of a unitary actor but to mean 
an ensemble of institutions, rationalities, and practices of power (that can be con-
tradictory and conflicting) that acts both on the individual and the population as a 
whole.
2. The first GIEF was held in Farmleigh House, Dublin, on 8–9 Sept. 2009 
and the second meeting of the Forum took place at Dublin Castle on 7–8 Oct. 20.
. The GIN was announced by the minister for Foreign Affairs at the first GIEF 
and was officially launched in 200. It is a multinodal global network of those identi-
fied as influential Irish and those interested in Ireland who are living abroad.
*Thank you to Mary Hickman, Piaras MacÉinrí, and the Éire-Ireland anonymous 
reviewer for most helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.
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creating a new form of networked membership. Sovereignty, in this 
context, works less as an effect of the will of the territorially bound 
people and more through the network state’s ability to achieve and 
maintain global competitiveness and economic growth.  
It is true of course that state institutional arrangements pertaining 
to expatriates and diasporas have a long history, and Alan Gamlen 
argues that such “emigration state” systems are inherent in the na-
tion state form itself.4 But while some forms of institutionalized state-
diaspora relations are regular features of nation states,5 I argue that 
we are witnessing a neoinstitutionalization of state-diaspora relations. 
Indeed, diaspora engagement is increasingly promoted as a means 
of achieving neoliberal economic development and global competi-
tiveness by world institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter-
national Organization for Migration. Neoliberal economic develop-
ment is understood here as involving a shift toward the regulation and 
organization of the state through market forces and a view of gover-
nance as primarily concerned with protecting the “entrepreneurial 
and competitive behaviour of economic-rational individuals.”6 The 
effect of this market-oriented governance is that sovereign borders 
are breached and buttressed “both to extend and to constrain the 
. Alan Gamlen, “The Emigration State and the Modern Geopolitical Imagina-
tion,” Political Geography 27, no. 8 (2008): 80–56. 
5. Diaspora involvement in Irish politics predates the establishment of the state 
as in the case of political and underground organizations in the United States that 
provided financial help and actively lobbied the American government on behalf of 
anticolonial nationalist projects. For example, Irish-American funding helped sup-
port Daniel O’Connell’s Catholic emancipation campaign, Charles Stewart Parnell’s 
Home Rule campaign, Michael Davitt’s agrarian movement, and Eamon DeValera’s 
Irish Bond drive to help fund the establishment of the Irish Free State in 92–22 
(Conor O’Clery, The Greening of the White House [Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 996]). 
Moreover, since its establishment, the Irish state has formally engaged the diaspo-
ra through its consular functions and under international legislative requirements 
to protect its citizens abroad. The diaspora has also been engaged via state bodies 
such as those now known as Tourism Ireland, Culture Ireland, and IDA Ireland. In 
the 990s the strategic engagement of the diaspora, particularly elements within the 
Irish-American diaspora, was instrumental in creating the conditions to advance the 
Peace Process in Northern Ireland (Feargal Cochrane, The End of Irish America? Glo-
balisation and the Irish Diaspora [Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 200]; O’Clery). 
6. Thomas Lemke, “‘The Birth of Bio-Politics’—Michel Foucault’s Lecture at 
the Collège de France on Neo-Liberal Governmentality,” Economy & Society 0, no. 
2 (200): 97.
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regulatory ambit of states, both to valorize the local and to cast it into 
force fields well beyond itself.”7 
Anticolonial Irish nationalists aspired to achieve an independent 
state with exclusive political authority within its boundaries based 
on the “will” of the people. However, the Irish state now shares “this 
authority with networks of international agencies and institutions, 
including bodies such as the European Union (EU), the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and transnational business corporations” as 
well as the International Monetary Fund (IMF).8 Gaynor notes that 
“while the Irish state, as a strongly capitalist state, has long negoti-
ated its authority with domestic capitalist interests, this authority is 
now far more widely dispersed.”9 As such, state sovereignty and le-
gitimacy requires the negotiation of effective state relationships with 
other institutions and actors globally while simultaneously protecting 
the interests and security of citizens within its borders. 
In this article, I draw loosely on Manuel Castells’s concept of “the 
network state”10 and Cynthia Weber’s notion of “netizens”11 to argue 
that the GIEF and GIN provide an embryonic infrastructure for state 
networking in “the space of flows” to promote economic growth in 
Ireland.12 Although initiatives from within the diaspora are also im-
portant here, my focus in this article is specifically on state networking 
initiatives that engage sections of the diaspora in the project of eco-
nomic governance. In the section that follows I introduce the concepts 
of citizenship, “network state”/“netizen” and diaspora as mobilized in 
this article. The conditions that led to the establishment of the GIEF 
and GIN are then discussed, followed by an account of how the Irish 
7. John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, Ethnicity, Inc. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2009), 7.
8. Niamh Gaynor, “In-Active Citizenship and the Depoliticization of Commu-
nity Development in Ireland,” Community Development Journal 6, no.  (2009): 6. 
9. Gaynor, “In-Active Citizenship,” 6.
0. Martin Carnoy and Manuel Castells, “Globalization, the Knowledge Society, 
and the Network State: Poulantzas at the Millennium,” Global Networks , no.  
(200): –8; Manuel Castells, “A Network Theory of Power,” International Journal 
of Communication 5 (20): 77–87; and Manuel Castells, Communication Power (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
. Cynthia Weber, “Designing Safe Citizens,” Citizenship Studies 2, no. 2 
(2008): 25–2.
2. Manuel Castells, The Information Age, vol 2, The Power of Identity, 2nd ed. 
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 200).
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state networks specific sections/members of the diaspora. The focus 
shifts in the next section to “the network state” and “netizens” as 
emergent formations of governance before turning in a further sec-
tion to a discussion of how the Irish state mobilizes “netizens” via the 
apparently contradictory tropes of ancestry and affinity. The article 
concludes by reflecting on the new questions posed by the neoinstitu-
tionalization of state-diaspora engagement as shaped and reshaped in 
the ongoing project of harnessing global capitalist flows.
Citizenship, Network State/Netizen, and Diaspora
Citizenship is conventionally understood in terms of “legal member-
ship in a political community that confers rights, obligations, and be-
longing in relation to this political community.”13 It tends to be con-
ceived as a universal and unitary status whereby all citizens are deemed 
equal. But as the content, forms, meanings, and types of citizenship 
proliferate, the whole question of citizenship itself becomes “unsettled 
and unsettling.”14 For example, Engin Isin identifies a “new inten-
sity of struggles over citizenship associated with global movements 
and flows of capital, labour and people.”15 He and Greg Nielsen see 
these struggles as generating “new affinities, identifications, loyalties 
and hostilities across borders,” as well as “new scales of identification 
and claims-making.”16 Similarly, Peter Nyers notes that debates over 
the making and unmaking of citizenship have become considerably 
more complex with the emergence of dual and multiple citizenships 
in response to global mobilities.17 It is also the case that some citizens 
are treated as “more equal than others” insofar as more or less rights 
and obligations apply to them, frequently based on maintaining racial, 
classed, sexual, and/or gendered privilege. 
. Weber, “Designing Safe Citizens,” 29.
. Ibid.,” 25.
5. Engin F. Isin, “Theorizing Acts of Citizenship,” in Acts of Citizenship, ed. 
Engin F. Isin and Greg M. Nielsen (London: Zed Books, 2008), 6. 
6. Engin F. Isin and Greg M. Nielsen, “Introduction,” in Acts of Citizenship, ed. 
Isin and Nielsen, 2.
7. “Dueling Designs: The Politics of Rescuing Dual Citizens,” Citizenship Stud-
ies , no.  (200), 8.
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These social practices of citizenship are reflected in recent theo-
retical debates that conceive citizenship less in terms of status or sub-
stance and more in relation to how subjects constitute themselves or 
are constituted as “those to whom the right to have rights is due.”18 
As such, the focus is on those contexts and encounters that “instanti-
ate ways of being that are political.”19 Certain acts are seen as creating 
a sense of the possible and of “a citizenship that is ‘yet to come,’” that 
is, those acts of claims making (and acts of state recognition) that 
“implicitly ask questions about future responsibilities between states 
and members.”20 The aim in this article is to move beyond liberal 
assumptions around state/citizen relations linked to legal status in 
order to identify emergent formations of state and membership as 
shaped by forces of globalization. By focusing on the performative 
dimensions of citizenship that involve contested processes of recog-
nition and claims making, the aim is to locate Irish state diaspora 
engagement initiatives in wider sociological debates about changing 
formations of state and membership.
As territorially bound space is reconfigured by or collides with 
the space of flows, modern liberal citizenship, understood as ter-
ritorially bound and unitary, is less fit for purpose. Indeed, Weber 
argues that contemporary Western citizens are located in dual spaces 
of place and flows. As such, she suggests that these citizens can be de-
scribed as netizens—insofar as they exercise “rights in relation to the 
networked state through state/society networks.”21 Although the term 
is popularly understood to refer to participants in online communi-
ties, netizen is used more broadly in this article to suggest a form of 
membership arising from links to networks (both physical and vir-
tual) at a time when the electronic circulation of information, capital, 
finance, and images is gaining political and economic significance in 
“the space of flows.”22 In their project of cultivating diaspora-based 
netizens, sending states are in competition with multiple identities 
and allegiances circulating globally. As such, they have to find ways 
of developing a stronger pull on globally networked individuals than 
8. Isen and Nielsen, “Introduction,” 2.
9. Ibid.
20. Ibid., .
2. Weber, “Designing Safe Citizens,” 6. 
22. Ibid.
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competing sources of loyalty and identity. In this way, Weber argues 
that contemporary practices of citizenship combine with networks to 
produce the political/social identity of “netizenship.”23
Castells argues that networks throughout history have been “the 
most adaptable and flexible organizational forms,” but until the ad-
vent of new digital networking technologies, they could not coordi-
nate or accomplish projects “beyond a certain size or complexity.”24 
As such, he differentiates contemporary networks from networks in 
the past by their “capacity to decentralize performance along a net-
work of autonomous components, while still being able to coordinate 
all this decentralized activity.”25 Networks are understood here as “a 
set of interconnected nodes, the distance between social positions be-
ing shorter where such positions constitute nodes within a network as 
opposed to lying outside that particular network.”26
The network state is understood by Castells as an emergent prac-
tice of power sharing in which governmental institutions at local, re-
gional, national, and global levels network as a means of engaging 
the challenges of globalization. This conception of the network state 
is developed in this article to include state networking of influential 
global economic actors. As the role of flexible networks expands, Cas-
tells sees power as “no longer concentrated in institutions (the state), 
organizations (capitalist firms), or symbolic controllers (corporate 
media, churches). It is diffused in global networks of wealth, power, 
information and images, which circulate and transmute in a system 
of variable geometry and dematerialized geography. Yet, power does 
not disappear. Power still rules society, it still shapes and dominates us.”27 
However, the embedding of power within global networks modifies 
the workings and outcomes of power and culture such that some 
nodes become more important than others, thus changing relation-
ships between nodes.28 Moreover, the in-built flexibility of networks 
enables speedy responses to global market trends.
2. Weber, “Designing Safe Citizens,” 9.
2. Manuel Castells, “The Network Society: From Knowledge to Policy,” in The Net-
work Society: From Knowledge to Policy, ed. Manuel Castells and Gustavo Cardoso (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2005), .
25. Castells, “The Network Society,” .
26. John Urry, Global Complexity (Cambridge: Polity, 200), 9.
27. Castells, The Information Age, 2–25 (emphasis in original). 
28. See Castells, The Information Age and “A Network Theory of Power.”
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Finally, my use of the term diaspora in this article does not imply a 
static or clearly bounded group but rather a “category of practice,” or 
a performative entity, that is, the result of the projects of states, multi-
generational diasporic groups, émigrés, and religious organizations.29 
It is made up of “extra-territorial groups that, through processes of 
interacting with their origin state [and multilocated diaspora politics], 
are in various stages of coalescence or dissipation.”30 Interest in the 
developmental potential of diasporas was legitimated in the 2000s by 
a “new enthusiasm around migrants as development agents.”31 One 
effect is that in some respects diasporas can become artifacts of the 
economic development agendas of global institutions—World Bank, 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Na-
tions (UN), and state diaspora engagement initiatives.
An Emergent Irish State Infrastructure for Engaging  
the Diaspora
During the 990s President Mary Robinson promoted the diaspora 
as an important constituency of the Irish nation with a legitimate 
claim to state recognition. She also mobilized the diaspora as an 
example of Irish religious and cultural tolerance with pedagogical 
potential for the promotion of peace in Northern Ireland.32 More-
over, key Irish-American figures were mobilized during the 990s 
to enlist the support of United States governments in helping bring 
about a resolution to the Northern Ireland conflict.33 These political, 
cultural, and symbolic shifts with regard to diaspora recognition and 
engagement created the conditions for a neo-institutionalization of 
state-diaspora relations in the 2000s. 
In line with undertakings by the state under the Belfast or Good 
Friday Agreement (998), Article 2 of the Constitution of Ireland 
was amended following a referendum in 998 to assert that “the 
29. Gamlen, “The Emigration State.”
0. Ibid., 82.
. Thomas Faist, “Diversity—A New Mode of Incorporation,” Ethnic and Ra-
cial Studies 2, no.  (2009): 7–90.
2. See Breda Gray, Women and the Irish Diaspora (London and New York: Rout-
ledge, 200), 5–56 and 58–59.
. Cochrane, The End of Irish America?
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Irish nation cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish ancestry liv-
ing abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage” (emphasis 
added). The article was also amended to recognize “the entitlement 
and birthright of every person born in the island of Ireland . . . to be 
part of the Irish Nation” (emphasis added). However, the provi-
sion for birthright citizenship was rolled back in the Irish Citizen-
ship and Nationality Act (200) following the Citizenship Referen-
dum (200) in which a government proposal to restrict citizenship 
based on birth in Ireland was overwhelmingly passed. This legisla-
tion grants birthright citizenship only to children with one parent 
who has been legally resident in the state for three of the previous 
four years.34 The combined effect of this legislation and the consti-
tutional identification of a “special affinity” with those of Irish an-
cestry abroad, render ancestry a central badge of Irish belonging. 
Moreover, the symbolic inclusion of the diaspora in the Constitution 
through ancestry legitimates the institutionalization of the state’s re-
lationship to the diaspora, including the establishment of the Task 
Force on Policy Regarding Emigrants (200)35 and the Irish Abroad 
Unit in the Department of Foreign Affairs in 200. Through these 
initiatives, the diaspora (relabeled “The Irish Abroad”) was recog-
nized as a legitimate constituency of the state and was mapped via 
statistical data, research, and policy recommendations.36
With the establishment of the Irish Abroad Unit a new diaspora-
wide Emigrant Support Program (ESP) was launched building on the 
more modest DÍON project, which had been established in 98 to 
fund welfare services for marginalized Irish in Britain. The ESP sig-
nificantly increased funding for welfare, cultural, and sporting activi-
. See Iseult Honohan, “Citizenship Attribution in a New Country of Immigra-
tion: Ireland,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 6, no. 5 (200): 8–27. Hono-
han also notes that the length of residence condition does not apply to children born 
to British citizens. 
5. See Task Force on Policy Regarding Emigrants Report (Dublin: Department of 
Foreign Affairs, 2002).
6. See, for example, Bronwen Walter, Breda Gray, Linda Almeida Dowling, 
and Sarah Morgan, A Study of the Existing Sources of Information and Analysis about 
Irish Emigrants and Irish Communities Abroad (Dublin: Department of Foreign Af-
fairs, 2002). The Irish Catholic Church and Irish diaspora organizations were also 
instrumental in shaping these initiatives (see, for example, Brian Harvey, Emigration 
and Services for Irish Emigrants: Towards A New Strategic Plan [Dublin: Irish Episcopal 
Commission for Emigrants, 999]).
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ties across the diaspora. Between 2005 and 200 over i60 million was 
allocated to Irish welfare, culture, and heritage organizations abroad 
under this program. As the recipient of i8 million of the i2 million 
allocated in 200, marginalized members of the diaspora in Britain 
represent the main recipients of this form of state support. As such, 
the ESP establishes a claims-making relationship between specific 
sections of the diaspora and the state and diaspora constituencies are 
differentiated depending on the governmental project in hand. 
The funding of welfare services to sections of the diaspora is le-
gitimated by what is seen as a debt owed to those who were forced 
to leave and whose remittances sustained Ireland in less prosperous 
times.37 However, funding for culture and heritage projects abroad 
is justified in terms of a need to foster “a greater sense of identity 
and belonging within Irish communities and strengthen their links 
with Ireland.”38 Although the ESP has suffered some cuts due to the 
fiscal crisis, funding continues at a level of around i2 million per 
annum. Since 2008, however, it has moved backstage somewhat with 
the launch of a new strand of diaspora engagement focused specifi-
cally on promoting economic recovery. Although different rationales 
for diaspora engagement underpin the ESP and new initiatives under 
the economic strand, a move toward integrating them is evident in 
the 202 Emigrant Support Program objectives, which include the 
funding of “projects and initiatives . . . which support the outcomes 
of the Global Irish Economic Forum.”39
The Global Irish Economic Forum, Global Irish Network 
The inaugural meeting of the Global Irish Economic Forum (GIEF) 
took place at Farmleigh House, Dublin, in 2009 and brought togeth-
er 2 of “the most influential members of the global Irish commu-
nity with a record of high achievement in business and culture, as 
well as a number of individuals with a strong business connection to 
7. Dáil Eireann, Debate Private Members’ Business—Economic Plight of 
Irish Emigrants: Motion, 578: , Tuesday, 27 Jan. 200, http://debates.oireachtas.ie/
dail/200/0/27/00025.asp (accessed 0 Sept. 20).
8. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Overview of Emigrant Support Pro-
gramme 202, http://www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx?id=292 (accessed 9 Jan. 202).
9. Ibid.
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Ireland.”40 Launching the initiative, the minister for Foreign Affairs 
suggested that the government needed to rethink its relationship with 
the diaspora following its successful partnership on the Peace Process 
in Northern Ireland. He stated that the global Irish constitute “one 
of the most powerful and far-reaching resources at our disposal and 
. . . we have identified some of the most successful individuals from 
that global community.”41 As such, the Forum was convened with two 
central objectives: “to explore how the Irish at home and abroad, and 
those with a strong interest in Ireland, could work together and con-
tribute to our overall efforts at economic recovery; and to examine ways in 
which Ireland and its global community could develop a more strategic 
relationship with each other, particularly in the economic sector.”42
These objectives are in line with state economic policy as artic-
ulated in a series of government reports, including the Strategy for 
Science, Technology and Innovation 2006–2013, Building Ireland’s Smart 
Economy (2008), and the Report of the Innovation Taskforce (200),43 
all of which identify the fostering of global economic networks as the 
engine of economic recovery. For example, the Report of the Innova-
tion Taskforce (200) recommended that state agencies and education 
institutions should jointly market and brand Ireland “as a leading 
innovation location and destination of choice” for overseas investors: 
an “International Innovation Development hub.” The objectives of 
the GIEF are also intended to complement foreign policy as articu-
lated in the Ireland-United States Strategic Review, which noted that: 
0. Micheál Martin, “Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the pub-
lication of the One Year On Report on the Global Irish Economic Forum,”  Oct. 
2009. Countries represented included the United States ( attendees), Britain, Eu-
rope, Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, New Zea-
land, the Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, and the UAE. 
. Micheál Martin, “Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs Launching 
the Global Irish Economic Forum,” 0 Apr. 2009. 
2. Department of Foreign Affairs, Global Irish Economic Forum Report, Dub-
lin: Department of Foreign Affairs, September 2009, http://www.dfa.ie (accessed 2 
Sept. 20).
. See Building Ireland’s Smart Economy, http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Build-
ing_Ireland’s_Smart_Economy (accessed 0 Jan. 200); Innovation Taskforce Report, 
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Innovation_Taskforce (accessed  Nov. 20); 
Strategy for Science, Technology and Innovation 2006–2013, Department of Jobs, Enter-
prise and Innovation, http://www.djei.ie/science/technology/sciencestrategy.htm (ac-
cessed 26 Oct. 20).
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“The current economic downturn represents a timely stimulus to 
look again at our overseas communities, particularly in the US, and 
to see how this valuable resource can be elevated to a new and even 
more dynamic level.”44
Initiatives arising from the Forum were “not formally endorsed by 
Government” but were identified by the Department of Foreign Af-
fairs as “reflecting the opinions and suggestions advocated by those 
who participated at Farmleigh. Some of the proposals were of a na-
ture that they could be more effectively progressed by the private 
sector.”45
Thus the Forum was to work less as a site of state policy-making, 
than as a strategic collaborative network for identifying diverse state 
and private-sector-led projects for Irish economic recovery. Although 
the convener of the forum, the state is just one actor in this flexible 
and reconfigurable global network, but as a member engages with 
and responds to the recommendations of cosmopolitan economic 
elites in the diaspora. For example, the Silicon Valley –based Irish 
Technology Leadership Group (ITLG), which gained Irish state sup-
port for a new Irish Innovation Center to support Irish technology 
companies in the valley, also helped shape higher educational initia-
tives in Ireland to support the smart economy.46
Reflecting on the significance of the Global Irish Economic Fo-
rum, the Department of Foreign Affairs “One Year On” progress re-
port noted that it “not only had a transformative impact on Ireland’s 
relationship with leading members of the Diaspora but also increased 
recognition of the advantages inherent in a mutually beneficial re-
lationship between Ireland and the global Irish . . . in particular in 
providing a competitive edge in certain key markets.”47 In answer to a 
. Embassy of Ireland, Ireland and America: Challenges and Opportunities in a 
New Context,  Mar. 2009, http://www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx?id=879 (accessed 
0 Aug. 200; emphasis added).
5. Department of Foreign Affairs, Progress Report on Follow Up to The Global Irish 
Economic Forum, 200, 2–, Dublin: Department of Foreign Affairs, February, http://
www.dfa.ie (accessed 2 Sept. 20).
6. Karen Lillington, “Innovation Has to Get Beyond Talk and Find the Real 
Doers,” Irish Times Business, 9 Mar. 200.
7. Department of Foreign Affairs, The Global Irish Economic Forum One Year 
On (Dublin: Department of Foreign Affairs, October 200), , http://www.dfa.ie (ac-
cessed 2 Sept. 20).
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Dáil question about the GIEF in June 20, the tánaiste and the min-
ister for the aptly retitled Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Eamon Gilmore, noted that “the broad economic policies that were 
advocated by many participants were reflected significantly in Bud-
get 200” and that the “follow-up process” had assisted in other work 
underway across government including the implementation of the 
Building Ireland’s Smart Economy strategy and the recommenda-
tions of the Innovation Task Force.48
Perhaps the most significant outcome of the inaugural GIEF was 
the Global Irish Network (GIN). Members of this network would 
act “as partners with Government in spreading key economic mes-
sages abroad, advising on specific initiatives and assisting Irish busi-
ness development overseas.”49 At the launch of the GIN in London in 
February 200, the minister noted that “00 people, based in the four 
corners of the world but all with a strong connection to Ireland” had 
accepted his invitation to participate in this network. Membership 
was made up of those identified as having “a record of high achieve-
ment in international business or [who] have assisted in the promo-
tion of Ireland abroad through their prominence in the cultural or 
sporting worlds.”50 As a government initiative the aim is “to harness 
their expertise and experiences . . . [and] work together to deepen 
our engagement with Irish communities worldwide and to spread 
the message that Ireland is absolutely open for business, and remains 
an attractive place for international investment, business people and 
tourists alike.”51 Crucially, the Global Irish Network was to, “for the 
first time, integrate the most influential Irish connected individuals 
into one global group.”52 In a later speech, the minister legitimated 
the state-network relationship by emphasizing a “widespread accep-
tance that a small country like ours must maximize the potential of all 
8. Eamon Gilmore, “Written Answers—Certificates of Irish Heritage,” Tues-
day, 2 July 20, http://debates.oireachtas.ie/dail/20/07/2/0007.asp (accessed 9 
Jan. 202).
9. Department of Foreign Affairs, Global Irish Economic Forum Report, 8.
50. Micheál Martin, “Speech Launching the Government’s Global Irish Net-
work at the Embassy of Ireland,” London,  Feb. 200, http://www.dfa.ie (accessed 
 June 200). 
5. Martin, “Speech,”  Feb. 200.
52. Ibid.
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sources of “soft power,” of which our Diaspora is a prime example.”53 
Regional meetings of GIN were hosted in key markets for Irish ex-
ports, including London, Paris, New York, Abu Dhabi, and Shanghai 
during 200. 
A second GIEF was held on 7–8 October 20 at Dublin Castle.54 
The taoiseach, in his opening address, celebrated the contribution of 
approximately 270 attendees as “emissaries, with outstanding reputa-
tion and generosity, bringing Ireland’s message of regeneration and 
resurgence to and from no fewer than 7 countries.”55 In his address, 
the tánaiste56 commented on the willingness of the global Irish “to 
serve the interests of our country” and suggested that “in doing so 
they are role models for a new generation of leaders, both at home 
and among the Diaspora.  They show that service is an important 
part of what it means to be Irish.”57 He went on to define “diaspora 
engagement” not as “an aspirational or unquantifiable concept” but 
“a powerful relationship-building—an arm of our industrial, eco-
nomic and diplomatic policy—that delivers innovative and practical 
initiatives.”58
Progress since the first GIEF in 2009 was announced by the 
tánaiste and included: the establishment of the GIN; the Farmleigh 
Fellowship program designed to equip Irish graduates “with the busi-
ness, cultural and communication skills necessary to succeed in Asia 
within 5 years”; the launch of the “WorldIrish.com—an online com-
munity for Irish people and those who think Irish”; the appointment 
5. Micheál Martin, “Opening Speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the 
Ireland Funds Global Young Leaders Conference,” Farmleigh, 9 June 200, http://
www.dfa.ie (accessed 7 Aug. 200).
5. Approximately 270 people from 7 countries attended this Forum meeting, 
which addressed fifteen different themes in sixteen working groups over two days. See 
Report of Working Group Discussions in Second Global Irish Economic Forum, University 
College Dublin Michael Smurfit Graduate Business School, http://www.globalirish-
forum.ie/20ForumReports.aspx (accessed 9 Dec. 20). 
55. Enda Kenny, “Speech by Taoiseach at Global Irish Economic Forum,” 7 Oct. 
20, http://www.merrionstreet.ie/index.php/20/0/speech-by-taoiseach-at-global-
irish-economic-forumon-friday-7-october-20-dublin-castle/?cat= (accessed 0 
Oct. 20). 
56. The tánaiste is also minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade.
57. Eamon Gilmore, “Tánaiste’s Opening Address to the Global Irish Economic 
Forum,” 7 Oct. 20, http://www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx?id=8782 (accessed 0 Dec. 
20).
58. Gilmore, “Tánaiste’s Opening Address.”
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of actor Gabriel Byrne as Cultural Ambassador for Ireland;59 the 
launch of the Certificate of Irish Heritage; and “an expansion of the 
range and geographic location of Irish business networks abroad.”60 
These initiatives involved a combination of state-led, private-sector-
led, and state-private sector partnership arrangements.
The topics addressed by the second GIEF were decided by the 
government and reflected “the priorities identified in the new Pro-
gramme for Government, and the challenges facing us on the path to 
recovery.”61 The agenda for the two-day forum was designed around 
specific key objectives, including the development of “a structured 
engagement between the Government and leading business figures 
from our Diaspora, and from among our friends abroad”; rebuilding 
Ireland’s “international reputation”; and establishing “a register of 
international advocates” in the following six sectors: Foreign Direct 
Investment, the financial services sector, the promotion of culture 
abroad, tourism, assisting Irish exporting Irish companies, and Ire-
land’s international reputation. In calling for specific action-oriented 
ideas to be generated, the tánaiste also invited participants “to con-
sider how to engage the next generation of the Diaspora.”62 
The work groups were facilitated by the University College Dub-
lin Michael Smurfit School of Business, and the relevant ministers, 
ministers of state and the heads of government departments and state 
agencies, were present in most groups. The following five overarching 
themes emerged from the groups: reenvisioning Ireland; reestablish-
ing our reputation; reengagement; reenergizing Ireland; and reform-
ing Ireland.63 The theme of reenvisioning Ireland 
drew on the Taoiseach’s idea of building an Ireland that by 206 will 
be the best small country in the world to do business in. Ireland can 
be a world leader in a number of sectors including food export, green 
59. Gabriel Byrne played a central role in the “Imagine Ireland” festival (200–
)—a year of Irish arts in America sponsored by Culture Ireland. He has recently 
announced his intention to resign as cultural ambassador for Ireland halfway into the 
expected three-year period owing to work pressures.
60. Gilmore, “Tánaiste’s Opening Address.”
6. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
6. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, The Report of the Second Global Irish 
Economic Forum (22 Nov. 20), http://www.globalirishforum.ie/20ForumReports.
aspx (accessed 9 Dec. 20). 
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economy, entrepreneurship, innovation and culture. Entrepreneur-
ship and innovation should be encouraged, and entrepreneurs rec-
ognised as “heroes.” Our advantage as a world leader in the culture 
should be further expanded.64
The reengagement theme focused on “the importance of a ‘struc-
tured mobilisation’ of the diaspora” through activities such as “men-
toring, offering placements and internships, developing an invest-
ment vehicle through which the diaspora could provide seed funding 
for Irish business, and in communicating positive messages.”65
A long list of recommended initiatives related to these themes 
emerged from the group deliberations. However, former United 
States President Clinton’s announcement in his address to the forum 
of his intention to host an investment summit for Ireland in New York 
in February 202 caught the headlines. When this summit took place, 
it included the chief executive of Bank of America Brian Moynihan, 
former treasury secretary Robert Rubin, and former chief executive 
of Citigroup Wilbur Ross (the private equity investor who helped re-
capitalize Bank of Ireland), chairman of Allen and Company Don 
Keough, and founder of “Riverdance” John McColgan.66 Just after 
the investment summit, President Clinton briefed about one hun-
dred members of the Global Irish Network and noted that “one of 
the hi-tech guys talked about how great Ireland is for hi-tech,” and 
another said: “It’s not just a great base for Europe. It’s also a great 
place for jumping into Africa.”67
6. Ibid., 6.
65. Ibid.
66. See Lara Marlowe, “Clinton Asks US Business to Invest in Ireland in New 
York,” Irish Times (Fri., 0 Feb. 202), http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/front-
page/202/020/225780.html (accessed 2 Feb. 202). On the day of Clin-
ton’s investment summit, three IDA Ireland backed firms (Abbott Pharmaceutical, 
Hewlett Packard, and Big Fish Games) announced 85 new jobs at locations in Cork, 
Kildare, Galway, and Sligo. See John Collins “IDA-Backed Firms Bring 85 Jobs to 
Four Sites,” Irish Times (Fri., 0 Feb. 202). http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/
finance/202/020/22575620.html?via=rel (accessed 2 Feb. 202). 
67. Lara Marlowe, “Clinton Gives Top Investors His Folksy Hard Sell,” Irish 
Times (Fri., 0 Feb. 202), http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/202/020 
/2257728.html?via=rel. Another high-profile initiative emerging from the sec-
ond GIEF was the launch by the minister for Transport, Tourism and Sport of “The 
Gathering,” a yearlong tourist event in 20 that is seen as having the potential to 
bring over 00,000 extra visitors to Ireland.
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Local chapters of the GIN were more formally established follow-
ing the second GIEF with a high level being set up to oversee the 
effective working of the network. Since the second GIEF, monthly 
briefing reports have been sent to GIN members by the taoiseach 
and tánaiste (based on input from this working group) to inform their 
networking activities on behalf of Ireland. Networks operate through 
shared protocols and, at present, the state can be seen as the lead 
protocol programmer. However, the relative power of different nodes 
in different contexts and at different points in the life of the network 
will affect which nodes define the network protocol.68 
The establishment of an Advisory and Implementation Group, 
co-chaired by the taoiseach and the tánaiste and including key of-
ficials from relevant government departments and members of the 
GIN from each of the main geographic areas was also announced at 
the second GIEF.69 This group is to meet twice a year to implement 
those initiatives deemed appropriate and to coordinate the overall 
work program of the GIN. Its work will be supported by the Irish 
Abroad Unit of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in co-
operation with relevant other departments, and nongovernment rep-
resentatives will work closely with ambassadors in keeping the wider 
network membership informed of developments.
The Network State and Irish Netizens
Rhetoric, myth, and discourse to varying extents both shape and 
serve to legitimate state diaspora engagement through the GIEF and 
GIN. However, when it comes to the specifics of legal status, the re-
lationship between the Irish state, the forum, and network members 
cannot be understood in terms of the liberal social contract and as-
sociated versions of citizenship. Instead, this relationship can be seen 
as an emergent formation of governance involving pragmatic engage-
ment between state and key diaspora-based actors in their mutual 
interests. Although not all-defining of the state or netizen members, 
this engagement forms an aspect of the activities of both and has ma-
terial effects in relation to state policy development and the creation 
of new lines of access to governance. 
68. Castells, “A Network Theory of Power.”
69. Gilmore, “Tánaiste’s Opening Address.”
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In establishing the GIEF and GIN, the state can be seen as net-
working itself with globally influential nodes of the diaspora and as 
constituting the diaspora in specific ways in doing so. The network 
acts as a mechanism through which the state is restructuring to ensure 
institutionalized relationships to global flows. As such, state power 
is reworked through the proliferation and management of networks, 
giving rise to what Castells calls “the network state.”70 This emerging 
network state shares authority along network nodes of different sizes 
linked by asymmetrical relationships, with the state maintaining a 
coordinating function at this early stage. 
State diaspora engagement can be seen in terms of an “extra- 
territorially extended state” that has “the power to disburse re-
sources outside its territory” by creating “new forms and degrees of 
membership.”71 But this state extension of recognition is not necessar-
ily taken up by targeted members of the diaspora who can voluntarily 
engage or not. In contrast with resident citizens and immigrants living 
within the territorial jurisdiction where the state retains its monopoly 
on violence, emigrants and the diaspora are not subject to the power 
of the sending state in the same way. Indeed, the power relationship 
between the state and diaspora members is inverted with members of 
the diaspora being able to choose whether and how they engage with 
the (sending) state.72 “High net-worth” members of the diaspora do 
not have to support state attempts to access network capital because 
they “can take their business elsewhere and vote with their feet.”73 
Therefore, in the relationship between the networked state and its 
networked members, the leviathan becomes the supplicant.74
Members of the GIEF and GIN are called upon to express a loose 
form of belonging to the national territorial state and to transform 
70. Castells, Communication Power.
7. Robert C. Smith, “Migrant Membership as an Instituted Process: Migration, 
the State and the Extra-Territorial Conduct of Mexican Politics,” International Migra-
tion Review 7, no. 2 (200): 29. 
72. See David Fitzgerald, Citizenship a la Carte, Working Paper no. 3, 2008, Center 
for Global Studies Project on Global Migration and Transnational Politics, George 
Mason University, cgs.gmu.edu/publications/gmtpwp/gmtp_wp_.pdf (accessed  May 
2009), and Roger D. Waldinger, “A Limited Engagement: Mexico and Its Diaspo-
ra,” The Selected Works of Roger D. Waldinger, 2009, http://works.bepress.com/roger_
waldinger/2 (accessed  June 200).
7. Fitzgerald, Citizenship a la Carte, .
7. See Fitzgerald, Citizenship a la Carte.
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this belonging into allegiance for the state.75 This is accomplished by 
becoming “immersed” in state/economy/society networks. “Netizens 
are expected to be carriers of citizenship/netizenship in the same way 
that codes or bytes of data are carriers of information in an elec-
tronic information network.”76 By networking to aid Irish economic 
recovery the expectation is that members of the Global Irish Net-
work will help increase tourist visits, business networks, and inward 
investment. As such, network members can be seen as immersing in 
networks for Ireland.77 In return, they are promised recognition as 
part of the Irish nation and privileged access to sections of the Irish 
government wherever they live. Precisely because they are located in 
the dual spaces of place and flows, these diaspora members can be 
described as “netizens” who exercise rights and obligations in rela-
tion to the networked sending state but also the state in which they 
reside through state/economy/society networks.78 
GIN members are imagined as autonomous entrepreneurial indi-
viduals of contemporary global capitalism, which makes them valu-
able members, but it is also why the state cannot rely on them to act 
as netizens: “What states must do is find ways to channel the desire 
of networked individuals for information into a desire for privileged 
access to state/society networks, thereby cultivating both belonging 
and allegiance.”79
Because states are competing with the myriad alternative attach-
ments and allegiances open to globally networked individuals, Weber 
argues that netizenship has to be “packaged as the most efficient, 
effective, and stylish way for networked individuals to experience 
their citizenship.”80 Membership of GIN is “packaged” as a marker of 
global Irish leadership, service, and identity81 and as ensuring privi-
leged access to political, economic, and cultural actors and goods. 
For example, the report of the second GIEF notes that “a consistent 
comment from participants was the appreciation of the high level of 
75. Weber, “Designing Safe Citizens,” 6.
76. Ibid.




8. Gilmore, “Tánaiste’s Opening Address.”
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participation by Ministers over the two days and their willingness to 
engage with participants and the ideas being proposed.”82 However, 
an ongoing concern for the state is how to promote and sustain a 
“thick” ethnic identification amongst globally dispersed cosmopoli-
tan members and potential members.
In a study of diaspora investment in homelands, Nielsen and 
Riddle observed that in addition to financial returns, factors such 
as emotional connection, a sense of duty, the strength of diaspora 
organizations and the potential for social returns motivated such in-
vestment.83 Similarly, studies on “investment by non-resident Indians 
indicate that ‘emotional ties with India’ ranks as the single highest 
motivating factor spurring these diasporic capital flows.”84 Indeed, 
emotional connections and feelings of obligation toward country of 
origin can “motivate diaspora members to invest despite unfavour-
able economic conditions.”85 
Reflecting on the size, diversity, and diffuseness of the Irish diaspo-
ra, the Ireland Fund Review of diaspora strategies suggests that “suc-
cessfully engaging the diaspora is . . . a long-term ‘hearts and minds’ 
business that requires perseverance and patience.”86 It also identified 
“an emotional and cultural connection” as the glue that sustains con-
nection with the home country.87 Yet, it is this emotional connection 
between Ireland and the Irish-American diaspora in particular that is 
currently in question. For example, the recent Ireland-U.S. Relations 
Review noted that with the end of the Northern Ireland conflict, and 
links between Irish America and Ireland changing, sentimental links 
to Ireland were on the wane.88 In response, the review recommends 
that the state actively cultivate appropriate dispositions and affective 
relationships to Ireland, primarily via appeals to ancestry and affinity. 
82. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, The Report, 2.
8. T. M. Nielsen and Liesl Riddle, Why Diasporas Invest in the Homeland: A Con-
ceptual Model of Motivation, SSRN 2007, http://ssrn.com/abstract=987725 (accessed 
8 Jan. 2009). 
8. Kingsley Aikins, Anita Sands, and Nicola White, A Comparative Review of 
International Diaspora Strategies: The Global Irish Making a Difference Together (Dublin: 
The Ireland Funds, 2009), 2.
85. Aikins et al., A Comparative Review of International Diaspora Strategies, 7.
86. Ibid., .
87. Ibid., 2.
88. Embassy of Ireland, Ireland and America, Washington, D.C., 2009.
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Diaspora Netizens through Ancestry and Affinity
In this section I consider some of the ways in which Irish ances-
try and affinity operate in the project of state diaspora engagement. 
In doing so, I examine the seemingly paradoxical invocation of Irish 
identity both as shared essence based on ancestry and as a resource 
in self-fashioning on the basis of affinity and choice. The recent 
launch by the Irish government of the “Certificate of Irish Heritage” 
is an example of how identity constituted as shared essence through 
ancestry is mobilized. The development of this certificate was an-
nounced by the Department of Foreign Affairs at the inaugural 
Global Irish Economic Forum and was initially recommended in the 
Ireland–United States Strategic Review. This review recommended that 
the certificate should entitle holders to some privileges; for example, 
it might “ensure more expeditious passage while at the same time 
conferring some additional recognition to the connection that many 
such individuals have with Ireland.”89 The certificate was officially an-
nounced in June 200 and is issued by a third-party agency acting 
under license from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. In 
answer to a Dáil question on this topic in April 20, the tánaiste sug-
gested that this certificate would  
give official recognition to the many people worldwide who are con-
scious of their Irish heritage and feel a strong affinity for Ireland. It 
will not, however, confer any citizenship or other legal rights or enti-
tlements to the successful applicants. Those applying for Certificates 
of Irish Heritage will be required to submit comprehensive details of 
their Irish ancestral connections and relevant documents and certifi-
cates to show their connection with Ireland.90 
The first Irish government-issued Certificate of Irish Heritage was 
presented by the tánaiste in September 20 to Bridget Hunter on 
behalf of her son Joseph Gerard Hunter, a firefighter who was killed 
in the World Trade Center on 9/. The certificate refers to his  County 
89. Ibid., 5.
90. Eamon Gilmore, “Dáil Questions. 2 Apr. 20, Written Answers” (emphasis 
added), www.debates.oireachtas.ie/dail/20/0/2/unrevised2.pdf (accessed 2 Jan. 
202).
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Galway heritage.91 Another certificate was presented by the consul 
general in Sydney to eighty-six-year-old Jim Edwards at a ceremony 
at the Irish Famine Memorial at Hyde Park Barracks in December 
20. Mr. Edwards’s great-great-grandmother, Hannah Rafferty, was 
born in County Roscommon and was an orphan girl sent to Australia 
following the Great Famine.92 The ersatz nature of these certificates 
is perhaps most evident in the presentation of a certificate by the 
taoiseach and tánaiste to former United States President Clinton, 
who claims Irish heritage and has called Ireland his second home.93 
Although these examples are of certificates presented by the state, 
certificates can also be applied for by any member of the diaspora 
who can prove an ancestral connection with Ireland. They are avail-
able in Irish, English, and Spanish and cost about i0.
The rationale for these certificates relies on a definition of cul-
ture, identity, and relatedness “as the product of inheritance.”94 As 
9. Lara Marlowe, “Gilmore to Honour Memory of 9/ Firefighter,” The Irish 
Times, Mon., 9 Sept. 20.
92. Irish Echo. “First Aussie Receives Irish heritage Cert,” 5 Dec. 20, http://
www.irishecho.com.au/20/2/5/first-aussie-receives-irish-heritage-cert/2 (ac-
cessed 10 Jan. 2011).
9. This presentation took place at the second GIEF at Dublin Castle in October 
20.
9. Catherine Nash, Of Irish Descent: Origin Stories, Genealogy, and the Politics of 
Belonging (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2008), .
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such, they simplify dispersed and hybridized relationalities and re-
produce racialized notions of belonging on local, national, and global 
scales.95 Such appeals to ethnic particularity and ancestry as the basis 
for membership can be promoted in chauvinistic ways. For example, 
economist, writer, and broadcaster David McWilliams, who claims 
credit for mobilizing the state to convene the GIEF, draws on this 
logic to promote the case of two young Argentinean women of Irish 
descent who wanted to claim Irish citizenship through their great-
grandparents. 
They wanted to come home. Sheila and Eileen have Irish blood on both 
sides going back to their eight great-grandparents. . . . English is their first 
language. They were taught by Irish nuns and priests. Their parents still 
speak with Midlands accents. They are part of a 500,000-strong Irish 
Argentinean population. . . . Yet these sisters were refused entry  visas. 
We refused entry to two young women, educated, sophisticated, 
willing to work, with invaluable ties to Latin America, fluent in the 
 second-most-widespread language in the world and, most crucially, 
committed emotionally to Ireland. If brain power is soft power, then 
surely this refusal makes no sense.96 
Blood connections, language, accent, and generational transfer of 
cultural similarity and emotional commitment are mobilized by 
 McWilliams alongside a resource argument for expanding member-
ship to anyone who can prove evidence of membership by ancestry. 
These women’s claims to membership are supported by 
 McWilliams because they are seen as racially and culturally proxi-
mate, while in another piece he refers to how the presence of for-
eigners resident in Ireland render the place unfamiliar and un-
friendly: “There are foreigners everywhere and our neighbours’ jobs 
are moving to the East. For sale signs are staying up longer, house 
prices are falling, yet the cost of living is rising. There are ten for-
eign children in your child’s class. . . . No-one says hello anymore. 
The place is different, it’s unravelling and we feel like outsiders.”97 
The contradiction between his calls to harness the diaspora as a 
95. See Nash, Of Irish Descent.
96. McWilliams, D. “Ireland’s Future Depends on Diaspora’s ‘Soft Power,’” Irish 
Independent,  Oct. 2007 (emphasis added).
97. David McWilliams, The Generation Game (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 2007), 
209.
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globalized resource for a small open economy and his desire for a 
unified cultural and political identity linked to the territorialized 
nation state seem to elude McWilliams. The space of Ireland is con-
ceived as a territorially bound place that should include members 
based only on ethnic ancestry and conflicts with conceptions of the 
same space as one that he believes should harness the “soft power” 
of the space of flows. 
The issuing of Certificates of Irish Heritage as incentives for iden-
tification enables a global connection to be forged through ancestry 
while emptying this official recognition of any substantive rights. This 
mode of recognition reinforces blood and ancestry as markers of be-
longing in line with the constitutional assertion of the Irish state’s 
affinity with those of Irish ancestry abroad. Although not specifically 
directed at members of the GIEF or GIN, the certificate is one of 
the outcomes of the inaugural GIEF. It helps push the controver-
sial question of emigrant/diaspora enfranchisement further down the 
agenda and panders to the “sense of exile from ‘authentic’ being that 
mark[s] the global ‘identity economy.’”98 Moreover, by making an au-
thenticated form of recognition available as a global consumer prod-
uct, this state initiative has created a new site in which Irish “culture 
and commodification constitute each other.”99 
Although diaspora membership is defined primarily through an-
cestry, the inaugural GIEF also called on the Irish state to “place 
greater value on, and build new connections with affinity Diaspora 
(foreign nationals who have lived in Ireland, but now returned to 
their countries of origin).”100 In a similar vein, Minister Martin em-
phasized the broad and inclusive approach being taken to defining 
Ireland’s global community: “The Irish diaspora is not limited to 
Irish citizens living abroad or to those who have activated citizenship. 
Instead, it encompasses all those who believe they are of Irish descent 
and feel a sense of affinity with this country.”101 This more mobile, 
hybridized, and multilocational relationship to Ireland suggests an 
98. Comaroff and Comaroff, Ethnicity, Inc., 0.
99. Ibid., 0.
00. Department of Foreign Affairs, Global Irish Economic Forum Report, 9.
0. Micheál Martin in Paul Cullen, “Certificate of Irishness Open to 70 million 
People Worldwide,” Irish Times, Mon., 2 June 200. 
267Éire-Ireland 47: 1 & 2  Spr/Sum 12 “The Network State” and “Netizens”
“Irish-mindedness,” or an affinity-based membership.102 Boyle and 
Kitchen suggest that any state strategy should “include the develop-
ment of an affinity Diaspora (the so-called ‘New Irish’ who would be 
encouraged to continue to play for ‘Team Ireland’ if they return to 
their home country or migrate to another country from Ireland).”103 
The Ireland Funds review of diaspora strategies, while mobilizing 
the primordial metaphor of the “tribe,” also adopts a utilitarian ap-
proach to including those with affinity to Ireland.
Given the staggering number of people around the world who are 
Irish, of Irish descent, Irish affiliation, or simply “friends of Ireland,” 
it makes sense that any definition of Irish diaspora or a subsequent 
diaspora strategy must ensure that each facet of the diaspora feels 
connected and engaged. There is no “one size fits all” policy, rather 
a plethora of tailored, highly researched and strongly executed poli-
cies must be introduced to ensure that each diverse segment of the 
diaspora recognizes the fundamental role and potential it possesses 
in shaping Ireland’s future—economically, culturally and socially.104 
A similar appeal to cultivating affinities with Ireland is made in the 
U.S.-Ireland Relations Review, which recommended the introduc-
tion of Certificates of Irish Heritage:
Consideration could also be given to establishing a fast track natu-
ralisation regime for those . . . not eligible for citizenship by virtue of 
descent, [who] have demonstrated a particular affinity with Ireland 
having spent time in Ireland as students, with the time, or a portion of 
the time spent in Ireland as a student, exceptionally counting towards 
residency in Ireland requirements of the naturalisation process.105
Although the notion of an affinity diaspora is often an “add on,” as 
above where it “could also be given” consideration, there is a sugges-
tion that diaspora members need to be enticed to become netizens 
by making membership of the global Irish community stand out as 
02. Mark Boyle and Rob Kitchin, Towards an Irish Diaspora Strategy. A Position 
Paper, NIRSA Working Paper. No. 37, 2008, http://www.nuim.ie/nirsa/research/docu-
ments/WP7_BoyleandKitchin.pdf (accessed 9 May 2009).
0. Boyle and Kitchen, Towards an Irish Diaspora Strategy, 8.
0. Aikins et al., A Comparative Review of International Diaspora Strategies, 7.
05. Embassy of Ireland, Ireland and America, Washington, D.C., .
268 Éire-Ireland 47: 1 & 2  Spr/Sum 12 “The Network State” and “Netizens”
a potentially rewarding site of attachment and engagement. It is not 
about being captured by Irish identity or Ireland, but rather about 
creating the conditions to freely choose Ireland and Irish culture as 
a focus of attachment. If such a “repackaging” of membership were 
successful, then those without ancestry might want to become mem-
bers, thus boosting the value of Irish membership.106 
Noting the “cultural basis that induces networking and trust-based 
transactions in the new business world,” Castells argues that culture 
and ethnicity are increasingly removed from specific historical con-
texts in becoming grounds for the “reconstruction of meaning in a 
world of flows and networks.”107 Yet, although ethnic identity can have 
the effect of anchoring meaning in the space of flows, it is also clear 
that the GIEF, GIN, and Certificate of Irish Heritage reduce Irish 
identity to a utility function and commodity. Indeed, the two regis-
ters of ancestry and affinity (nature and choice) work together within 
the market logic of contemporary neoliberal capitalism whereby cul-
ture is reduced to property, innovation, and economic relationships, 
while at the same time suggesting the impossibility of reducing cul-
tural identity to utilitarian ends. The joining of these registers con-
fuses “the deployment of ethnicity as a tactical claim to entitlement, 
and as a means of mobilization for instrumental ends, with the sub-
stantive content of ethnic consciousness.”108 In this “triangulation of 
culture, identity and the market,” Comaroff and Comaroff argue that 
the conjuncture of ancestry and affinity, “of choice and essence is just 
where it begins. Ethnicity, Inc. is where it ends.”109 The incorporation 
of ethnicity through the joining of blood and choice is underpinned 
by the simultaneous naturalization and commodification of cultural 
identity, which promises to “unlock new forms of self-realization, 
sentiment, entitlement, enrichment.”110 As such, the GIEF and GIN 
can be seen as caught up in neoliberal agendas that spawn “entre-
preneurial (singular) and ethno-preneurial (collective) subject[s] in a 
globalized economy of difference and desire.”111 
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Conclusion—Fostering Feeling for Netizen Membership 
Consistently ranked as one of the most globalized economies in the 
world since the late 990s, the Irish economy is impacted strongly by 
global economic forces.112 In this article, I have argued that one re-
sponse to globalizing forces is the development by the state of new in-
stitutional arrangements, including the Global Irish Economic Forum 
and the Global Irish Network. I point to some of the ways in which 
these arrangements involve the sharing of some state functions with 
globally connected members of the diaspora. While the GIEF and 
GIN are primarily utilitarian and pragmatic techniques of neoliberal 
governance through the global, in order to be effective, they require 
the creation of appropriate global Irish subjects who will commit to 
the agenda of embedding Ireland in the global economy. By global-
izing tropes of ancestry and affinity, Irish state diaspora-engagement 
initiatives simultaneously shape felt communities of belonging and 
create new entrepreneurial and ethno-preneurial subjects. Such affec-
tive communities can then be mobilized in driving mutual economic, 
political, and cultural aspirations and commitments. Membership is 
conceived here, not as “belonging-in-space,” but in terms of multiple 
attachments, as the “rise of  ethno-commerce” means that domains of 
existence such as ethnicity are marketized and charged attachments 
to “chosen” lifestyles and identities are actively cultivated. The neo-
institutionalization of state-diaspora relations in Ireland, as evident 
in the establishment of the GIEF and GIN, relocates politics and 
economics in the domain of culture, while at the same time locat-
ing culture in the domains of the political and economic. Thus, Irish 
culture (as ancestry and affinity; blood and choice) becomes “the 
taken-for-granted domain of collective action” in the global space of 
flows and in the drive to produce neoliberal capitalist entrepreneurial 
subjects.113 
As the state strikes a sovereignty bargain in relation to a diaspora 
defined through the joining of ancestry and affinity, its borders are 
displayed as a “softer shell,” emphasizing the benefits of the networks 
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that cross them.114 Yet the state borders continue to operate as a “hard 
shell” and symbol of social closure in relation to the status of citizen-
ship as revealed by Ireland’s immigration policies, withdrawal of birth-
right citizenship, and repeated emphasis on ancestry. It is important, 
therefore, that in considering state diaspora-engagement strategies, 
the dynamics that these strategies produce relating to the workings of 
the state itself, state borders, membership, and political community 
are examined. For as “ethnic commerce” globalizes, it also “sharpens 
the lines of division between enrichment and exclusion . . . [and] 
 everywhere underwrites new divisions and inequities.”115 
Matters of affiliation, allegiance, membership, and belonging have 
become important state projects as states simultaneously negoti-
ate the “space of place” the “space of flows.” But these projects are 
marked by contradictions between traditional hierarchical national 
state institutions and the “open-ended and multi-edged” nature of 
networks.116 To ensure that diaspora engagement enables national 
economic development, states are caught in contradictions and para-
doxes in relation to diverse constituencies of diaspora and the in-
terests of resident citizen members. However, these contradictions 
are produced for the most part by conflicting state policies around 
economic growth, global competitiveness, migration management, 
and persistent assumptions of territorially bounded membership and 
ancestry as essential markers of belonging. Yet as states are increas-
ingly networked and encourage networked forms of membership, 
new divisions arise in the intersections between spaces of flows and 
place, giving rise to new questions about “the mechanisms by which 
resources are transferred across state borders”117 and the kinds of 
membership they allow and disallow.
. Christopher Rudolph, “Sovereignty and Territorial Borders in a Global Age,” 
International Studies Review 7 (2005): . 
5. Comaroff and Comaroff, Ethnicity, Inc., .
6. Castells, Communication Power, 9.
7. Thomas Faist, “Migrants as Transnational Development Agents: An Inquiry 
into the Newest Round of the Migration-Development Nexus,” Population, Space and 
Place , no.  (2008): . 
